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Autonomous systems

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Robots and vehicles get model updates in the field, often from a supplier.

Intended, not deployed

Intended application areas. Vraelis has no customer deployments in them.

Models ship to machines in the field.

Updates land in someone else's fleet

In a facility or fleet the supplier does not operate.

An unexpected release is a security and operational risk

A different release, or the wrong machine, changes what it does.

The first question is which model

When a machine surprises you, the answer should come from a record.

Hypothesis

Robotics is one segment we study. Release and platform engineers at robotics suppliers and integrators meet this problem early.

The workflow, in this area

  1. Identify the release.
  2. Bind approval to the release and destination. Destination-bound approval: one machine's approval does not cover another.
  3. Integrate with a supported runtime.
  4. Compare approved and reported. A version mismatch shows as reload pending, not assumed.
  5. Preserve discrepancies, missing evidence and recovery.
Approved cpu-2 beside reported loaded cpu-1, with the differing fields marked.
Read-only evidence app, inside the controlled ONNX reference experiment.

Not claimed

  • No deployments on robots or vehicles, and no customers.
  • No robot or vehicle integration. The experiment is a synthetic ONNX CPU workload.
  • No protection against adversarial inputs or perception attacks.
  • No certification, and no evidence freshness for machines in the field: heartbeats are not built.
  • No hardware attestation. Runtime identity is a worker self-report.

Last updated: October 12, 2026